Abstract. In this paper we describe some research directions in social choice and aggregation theory taken at the "Centre de Mathématique Sociale" since the fifties. We begin by presenting some institutional aspects concerning this center. Then we sketch a thematic history by considering the following questions about the "effet Condorcet" ("voting paradox"): What is it? How is it overcome? Why does it occur? These questions were adressed in Guilbaud's 1952 paper (Les théories de l'intérêt général et le problème logique de l'agrégation) which will mark the beginning of our inquiry. The conclusion outlines some more recent research developments linked to these questions.
Introduction
Arrow's book Social Choice and Individual Values appeared in 1951 and immediately caused a considerable interest as well as critical discussions. In May 1952 Arrow went to the Conference on Risk held at Marseille and then to Paris where François Perroux head of the "Institut des Sciences Économiques Appliquées (ISEA)" had asked him to make a presentation of his work. The lecture entitled The rationality principle in collective decisions was given on 9 June 1952 Guilbaud, a mathematician 3 , was then one of the two assistant heads of the ISEA. Although Guilbaud's appointment to the 6th section of the "Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études" (EPHE now EHESS) took place only three years later, this paper must be taken as our departure point for our historical inquiry on the theory of social choice at the center created by Guilbaud. Indeed as we will see almost all the work in this field made at the center had its origin in ideas presented in this paper.
We have just spoken of "historical inquiry". But there are several ways to do the history of science. Here we will begin by the institutional history and then we will develop a thematic history. For the first one, we will first present the institutions and their members, then some scientific activities of these members (seminars, conferences, publications...) and in particular those related to the theories of decision and voting. The thematic history will be presented by considering the following questions about the "effet Condorcet": What is it? How is it overcome? Why does it occur? In our conclusion we will outline some developments of researches linked to these questions.
Institutional history
The "École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) 4 " is probably the most highly reputed French institution for social sciences researches (from history to linguistics through economy, demography, cognitive science, social psychology, sociology, anthropology, ethnology, geography....). Until 1975 when the École took its independance, it was just the sixth section of the "École Pratique des Hautes Études (EPHE)" 5 . In 1955 the president of the sixth section was the historian Lucien Febvre and secretary, the historian Fernand Braudel. Guilbaud, then 44 years old, was just leaving Perroux's Institute (ISEA). Claude Levi-Strauss and Charles Morazé, two members of the sixth section, asked him to join them as "directeur d'études" at the École (a position equivalent to a position of full professor at university) and he was elected this same year. Guilbaud presented to Febvre his project to do "de la mathématique sociale, à la Condorcet" 6 . He proposed to call his research group "Groupe de Mathématique Sociale", but Braudel asked him to add "et de Statistique" (so the acronym was GMSS) 7 . The group grew regularly by the addition of new members 8 of which we give only the names of those (more or less) concerned with social choice theory: Marc Barbut (1956 ), Pierre Rosenstiehl (1960 , Bernard Monjardet (1963) , Bruno Leclerc (1967) and Jacqueline Feldman (1967) (1968) (1969) . There were also (and there are still) more or less closely associated members like Jean-Pierre Barthélemy (now member) or Olivier Hudry. Note that all these persons, except J. Feldman who was a physicist, were mathematicians sometimes working also in computer sciences.
The first task of a "directeur d'études" to the École is to give seminars for advanced students and researchers. The title of Guilbaud's first seminar was Modèles mathématiques dans les sciences sociales (Mathematical models in social sciences) and he or others like Barbut gave such seminars up to now. In the sixties there was a great interest among many social scientists in the use of mathematical models 9 and several of them attended regularly these seminars. At the same time the mathematicians of the CAMS (see footnote 7) worked, or tried to work, since it was not necessarily easy, as well with historians (as Emmanuel Leroy-Ladurie), teaching of the sciences than the one given by the universities. In 1975 it contained six sections of which the most important were the sixth (created in 1947) and in 2002 it has only three sections (life and earth sciences, history and philology sciences, religious sciences). 6 See Mathématique sociale, Entretien avec G.Th. Guilbaud, Savoir et Mémoire n°4, Éditions de l'EHESS, Paris, 1993, and Rosenstiehl P, La mathématique et l'École. In Revel J, Wachtel N (eds) Une École pour les sciences sociales. Cerf and Éditions de l'EHESS, Paris, 1996. 7 When the "groupe" grew it became a "centre", and after some terminological variations it is now called "Centre d'Analyse et de Mathématique Sociale (CAMS)". Henceforth we will use only (so sometimes anachronistically) this acronym CAMS in our text. 8 The center has presently 25 members, plus some retired former members but still working at the center. 9 See for instance Armatte M, Feldman J, Leclerc B, Monjardet B, Schiltz MA, Selz Laurière M, (1989) Feldman, G. Lagneau and B. Matalon, Paris) . 15 An aim of this journal was also to promote exchanges between people teaching mathematics and statistics for social sciences and those teaching these sciences. In fact CAMS members and especially Guilbaud and Barbut played a significant role in the starting and the development of mathematical training courses for students in economics, psychology and sociology. In particular Barbut was one of the initiators of the creation of a new curriculum "Applied Mathematics and Social Sciences" presently existing in more than 30 french universities.
can quote: "Opinions et scrutins" (Opinions and votes, 1973) , "Modélisation des préférences et quasiordres" (Preferences modelization  and semiorders, 1978) , "Métriques et relations" (Metrics and relations, 1979) , "Condorcet" (1990) . Guilbaud was the first to read again the Essai and more generally Condorcet's works on "la mathématique sociale". Moreover he suggested to his colleague epistemologist Gilles Granger to do researches on this topic, researches which led to Granger's book "La mathématique sociale du marquis de Condorcet" (1956) . 16 One must point out that during these years the quasi totality of these papers were published in French, a fact that didn't favor their knowledge by an international audience. 17 Henceforth we will call Condorcet 's book simply the Essai. 18 The famous "Annales's school" of historians of the École (and in particular Braudel) supported the notion of the "long history". 19 Daunou and Lhuillier worked on voting procedures at the end of 18th century and the beginning of 19th century and both quote the Essai (see McLean I (1995) The first golden age of social choice 1784-1803. In: Barnett W, Moulin H, Salles M, Schofield N (eds) Social choice, Welfare and Ethics. Cambridge University Press, pp 13-33). 20 In his book An history of the mathematical theory of probability from the time of Pascal to that of Laplace (MacMillan, London, 1865) , In fact Todhunter devotes a chapter to a detailed analysis of the Essai but he completely misses the significance of Condorcet's study on the systems of propositions and their possible contradictions ("these results however appear of too little value to detain us any longer", page 375).
Guilbaud's paper was published in "Économie Appliquée", an economics journal, but it was written both for economists and mathematicians, a not so easy task 21 . The paper, like Arrow's book, uses finite mathematical structures, in particular binary relations and families of sets on finite sets 22 . We recall now the classical notations used in social choice theory for such structures. A = {x,y,z,...} is a finite set of m elements called alternatives (or issues, decisions, outcomes, candidates, objects, etc.) . N = {1,2,.....n} is a finite set of n elements called voters (or agents, persons, individuals, criteria, etc.) . The preference of a voter on the set A is given by a linear order 23 L = x 1 ...x k ...x m , where x 1 is the most preferred alternative, x 2 the second one, etc. If alternative x is preferred to alternative y in the linear order L, we write xLy or (x,y) L. More generally, if R is an arbitrary binary relation on A, we write xRy or (x,y) R when x is in the relation R with y. We denote by L the set of all linear orders on A: 21 Economists (with sufficient mathematical training) appreciated the paper (in the second edition of his book, Arrow describes it as a "remarkable exposition of the theory of collective choice and the general problem of aggregation"). But few mathematicians, -too often unaware or even contemptuous of social sciences-read it. 22 It is interesting to mention that Arrow had been introduced to such mathematics by Tarski. 23 Condorcet and most of his followers expressed the preference of a voter by such a linear order, i.e. by a transitive, antisymmetric and complete binary relation. We can now define Condorcet's majority rule(s) and the "effet Condorcet".
1 The Condorcet effect and its frequency
As is well known Condorcet proposed to adopt as a voting procedure the method retaining for each pair of alternatives the one (or the ones) supported by a majority of voters 24 . For a given profile ¥ , we denote by R MAJ (¥ ) (respectively R SMAJ (¥ )) the binary relation obtained by using the majority (respectively the strict majority). Formally
We call Condorcet's rule (respectively Condorcet's strict rule) the aggregation rule obtained by associating with each profile ¥ the relation R MAJ (¥ ) (respectively R SMAJ ). Note that when the number of voters is odd there is a single majority rule. Now Condorcet's majority rules are not L-preference aggregation functions since the majority preference relations can have cycles of length k (called k-cycles) greater than 2 (i.e. there can exist k ¦ 3 distinct alternatives x 1 ,x 2 ,....x k such that for instance x 1 R MAJ x 2 R MAJ x 3 .......x k R MAJ x 1 ).This fact discovered by Condorcet has been called "l'effet Condorcet" by Guilbaud. It is also known as the "paradox of voting". But we prefer the term "Condorcet effect" since as it will be shown in section 3.3 this effect is unavoidable and thus not really paradoxical.
The simplest case of such an effect is obtained for three alternatives x,y,z and three voters with the preferences xyz, yzx and zxy. The collective preference is then the 3-cycle shown in Figure 1 . Before trying to deal with the Condorcet effect a preliminary question has to be asked: is it frequent?
25 Guilbaud studies the case of three alternatives. He gives the frequency of the Condorcet effect for a number of voters respectively equal to 3 (5,6%), 4 (7%), 9 (7,8%) and 25 (8,4%) and a formula for this value when n goes to infinity: (1-3/© )Arccos(1/ )) = 0,08774. Since this formula was given in a footnote without explanation it intrigued somehow. But since Guilbaud's result there has been a considerable amount of work studying the probability of the effect or the weaker probability to have no Condorcet winner 26 . The general conclusion of these investigations is that the Condorcet effect is frequent especially when the numbers of alternatives and/or the number of voters is large. For instance if this frequency remains always small for three alternatives, it is 49% for 3 voters and 6 alternatives and about 96% for 25 voters and 9 alternatives (a situation quite possible in academic committees). Then if one is inclined to use majority rules as much as possible one must find ways to overcome this effect when it occurs. This was the real question raised by Condorcet and we will see below (in section 3.2.2) what was probably his answer. But more generally we will consider three approaches presented in Guilbaud's paper to overcome this effect. 25 In Black's book (The Theory of Committees and Elections (1958) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) the answer is given for three voters and three alternatives. In 1803 Daunou writes that the Condorcet effect "is by no means a rare occurence", but his assertion is based on wrong computations (See Mémoire sur les élections au scrutin, published in English translation In McLean I, Urken AB (eds) Classics of social choice. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1995, pp 237-276, page 243) . 26 See for instance a review of such works in Gehrlein WV (1983) Condorcet's paradox. Theory and Decision 15: . Note that the computation of the frequency is equivalent to computing the probability of the effet Condorcet under the so-called probabilistic model of "impartial culture" where each linear order has the same probability (1/m!) of being adopted by each voter. In this case Guilbaud's formula has been generalized (for instance in Gehrlein WV, Fishburn PC (1976) Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates. Journal of Economic Theory 13: 14-25). More generally the probability of the effect has been studied when the preferences of the voters follow various probability models (see again Gehrlein's 1983 paper).
T o o v e r c o m e t h e C o n d o r c e t e f f e c t ?

T o o v e r c o m e t h e C o n d o r c e t e f f e c t ? the generalized majorities rules
Condorcet's majority rule is defined by taking in each pairwise comparison of alternatives the preference supported by a majority, where a majority has been defined as a set of at least half of the voters. One can ask if by changing the size of majorities one can get a rule which will avoid the Condorcet effect. It is certainly possible in some sense. For instance if one requires now unanimity in order to have x preferred to y, then the collective preference obtained has no cycles since it is the partial order intersection of the linear orders of the voters. But this collective preference has no reason to be complete, i.e. to be a linear order and so we don't get a L-preference aggregation function. In fact such a unanimity rule can often lead to an indecisiveness that is not very satisfying. The term simple game to name this mathematical structure was justified in the context of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's book. But in fact such a structure appears in many fields of mathematics where to use the term simple game would be absurd. Unfortunately such an terminological absurdity has became unavoidable in social choice theory (note that from a mathematical point of view a simple game is nothing more than an order filter in the Boolean lattice of all subsets of S). n/2}. The unanimity rule is also a generalized majority rule since it is obtained by taking = {N}. More generally one can call "oligarchic" the generalized majority rule obtained for the simple game V = {W N : V W} where ! V N. Indeed such a rule amounts to take as collective preference the unanimous preferences of the voters belonging to V and ignoring the preferences of the other voters. A particular case is obtained for V = {i}. Then {i} is the family of subsets of N containing i and the associated rule can be called a dictatorial rule since the collective preference is always the preference of the voter i. Now the problem is to determine among all these generalized majority rules those that always induce a linear order, i. e. to determine the preference aggregation functions f that are L-preference aggregation functions. The answer is given in Guilbaud's paper and we will call it Guilbaud's theorem 29 : Observe that = {i} is equivalent to saying that is an ultrafilter 30 since when N is finite the ultrafilters on N are exactly the n families {i} (i
It is instructive to sketch the very simple proof. First one checks that the collective preference R ($ ) is antisymmetric and complete (i.e. a so- 29 In fact this theorem is a consequence of a more general result proved by Guilbaud and concerning a logical problem already raised by Condorcet. Let a set of binary ("yes or no") questions be logically linked in the sense that the answers to some imply the answers to others. A coherent opinion of an individual is defined as a set of answers to these questions respecting their links. What are the rules allowing one to aggregate several coherent individual opinions into a coherent collective opinion ? Guilbaud proves that if the aggregation rule must preserve all the possible logical links between these questions, then it must be dictatorial (page 306). A contrario, the use of, for instance, the majority rule can lead to an incoherent collective opinion, a fact called also "Condorcet effect" by Guilbaud. It is interesting to observe that this much more general Condorcet effect has been rediscovered in the eighties under the name of the "doctrinal paradox" and has led to results similar to Guilbaud's results (see List C, Pettit P (2002) (1) Now easy and well known results on tournaments say that a tournament is transitive (i.e. a linear order) if and only if it has no cycles and if and only if it has no 3-cycles (as in Figure 1 ). But to avoid a 3-cycle in R (( ) it is necessary and sufficient that satisfies the following condition:
for all U, V, W 1 , U2 V2 W 3 4
(2) Indeed in this case one cannot have three (generalized) majorities U,V,W and three alternatives x,y,z, with x preferred to y (respectively y preferred to z and z preferred to x) for each voter of U (respectively of V and W) since then a voter belonging to U2 V2 W would have a 3-cycle in his (her) linear order of preference. And conversely if there exists U, V, W 1 such that U2 V2 W =
4
, it is easy to construct a profile for which there will be a 3-cycle on a set {x,y,z} of three alternatives. It remains now to prove that a simple game satisfying condition (1) and (2) is an ultrafilter, which is easy. 
5
W (set of all weak orders on A) is dictatorial (in the sense that the strict preference of the dictator is the collective strict preference). One can get Arrow's theorem from Guilbaud's theorem. First one shows that an independent and Paretian L-preference aggregation function f is a preference aggregation function f associated with a simple game ( is the family of the decisive sets of f). By applying Guilbaud's theorem one gets that f is dictatorial. This result is extended to weak orders by using a domain restriction standard argument, probably found in Blau 32 for the first time. But obviously Arrow's proof in the second edition of his book or in his 1952 paper in French is direct and quicker. 31 A social welfare function is independent (of irrelevant alternatives) if the social preference on two alternatives depends only on the individual preferences on these alternatives and it is Paretian if x is socially (strictly) preferred to y if all the voters prefer (strictly) x to y. 32 See Blau JH (1979) 2) The term ultrafilter does not appear explicitly in Guilbaud's paper. But it suffices to read his proof to see that "followers of Bourbaki will notice an ultrafilter in the background" as Blau 33 would have said and as I observed it later: "then it is immediate that in the Boolean algebra of subsets of N, must be a maximal filter" 34 .
3) The characterization of ultrafilters given above can be improved. Indeed one has the following result: a family on an arbitrary set N is an ultrafilter if and only if it is strong and satisfies condition (2) 35 . Note also that this last condition can be written 
T o o v e r c o m e t h e C o n d o r c e t e f f e c t ? the Condorcet (median) procedure
@ (9 ,L) = A { nB (x,y), (x,y) C L }.
@
(9 ,L) is a measure of agreement between the profile 9 and the possible collective preference L, since it counts the number of pairwise agreements between the preferences of the voters and the linear order L. Now the procedure described in Guilbaud's sentence consists to:
Take as the collective preference a linear order L that solves the discrete optimisation problem: MAX{
For reasons that we will explain below we call this procedure the median procedure and we call median orders of a profile the corresponding linear orders obtained by applying it to this profile.
One can make several remarks on this median procedure. First this optimisation problem has at least one solution (since the set L is finite) but it can have several (an even many) solutions. It is easy to see that if there is no Condorcet effect, these solutions are given by Condorcet's majority rules. More precisely in this case and when the number of voters is odd there is a unique median order given by the two Condorcet's rules. Always in this case and when the number of voters is even one notes first that the strict majority relation R SMAJ (9 ) is a partial order contained in the majority relation R MAJ (9 ). Then there exists (at least) one linear order between (in terms of set-inclusion) these two majority relations and it is easy to understand that the median orders are all such linear orders. This is the "easy" case, whereas in the general case the computation of the solutions is a "difficult" problem 40 . Guilbaud's quotation (above) identifies Condorcet's procedure to overcome the Condorcet effect as the median procedure. In the case of three alternatives and of a Condorcet effect, Condorcet proposes to take as collective preference the linear order obtained by inverting the preference supported by the weakest majority. This is clearly equivalent to adopting the median procedure. When there are more than three alternatives, Condorcet's ambiguous proposals lead to several possible algorithms. And one can find profiles with a Condorcet effect for which none of these algorithms lead to a median order. But this is not very surprising considering the difficulty of the problem to find the median orders. On the other hand for Condorcet there is an objective linear order between the alternatives (for instance a true order of merit between candidates). The aim of the voting procedure is to find this objective order from those given by the voters and containing errors. Then, in the search for this true order, he introduces a probabilistic model to find what we would call the "maximum likelihood" order. Young's analysis of this Condorcet model led him to conclude that the orders obtained by the corresponding procedure are the median orders 41 . So following Guilbaud's and Young's interpretations we will consider that Condorcet has been the creator of the median procedure for profiles of linear orders and we will call this procedure the Condorcet generalized rule.
Now we should explain why we have called it the median procedure. To do that we have to define what is a median in a metric space. Let (E,d) be an arbitrary (finite) metric space, and (x 1 ,...,x n ) an n-tuple of points in this space.
A (metric) MEDIAN of (x 1 ,...,x n ) in the metric space (E,d) is any point m of E minimizing the sum D {d(x i ,x), i = 1,...n}
Here also since E is finite it is clear that the n-tuple (x 1 ,...,x n ) has at least one median. In fact it has often several medians.
It remains then to show that the median orders described above are medians in a metric space, which is easy. We take as the metric space E the set of all linear orders L endowed with the following distance: for L,L' L, d K (L,L') = |{pairs {x,y} such that xLy and yL'x, or xL'y and yLx}|.
Thus this quantity measures the disagreement between the two linear orders L and L' and it is a distance since it is nothing more than half of the classical symmetric distance |L\L'| + |L'\L| between these two orders 42 . 41 See Young HP (1988) Condorcet's Theory of Voting. American Political Science Review 82: 1231-1244. 42 We denote this distance by d K since it has been implicitly used by Kendall as early as 1938 (the well-known Kendall "correlation coefficient" tau is nothing more than the normalization of this distance between -1 and +1) as well that by Kemeny (see below). Now an old result of Barbut 43 proves our claim: For One can note that as early as 1959 Kemeny proposed to take as collective preference(s) for a profile of linear orders its medians in the metric space (L, d K ) defined above 44 . This proposal was later published in Kemeny and Snell's famous book Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences and so this procedure is widely known as Kemeny's procedure 45 . One can now add that Kemeny's procedure, the median procedure and Condorcet's generalized rule are all the same.
We have not yet finished with medians since we are turning now to the notion of algebraic medians, a notion closely related to the notion of majority. Note first that a profile numbers is x 2 = Max{Min{x 1 ,x 2 }, Min{x 2 ,x 3 }, Min{x 3 ,x 1 }} = Min{Max{x 1 ,x 2 }, Max{x 2 ,x 3 }, Max{x 3 ,x 1 }}.
The fact that the majority rule is a median rule appears informally several times in Guilbaud's paper (see for instance pages 279 and 291). But it induces consequences linked to the third approach to overcome the Condorcet effect, the so-called Condorcet (or restricted or coherent) domains.
T o o v e r c o m e t h e C o n d o r c e t e f f e c t ? the restricted domains
We will use the following definition of a restricted domain of linear orders. Thus a set of linear orders is a Condorcet domain if the strict majority rule applied to any profile of linear orders of the domain leads always to an asymmetric relation without cycles. Note that if |N| is odd such a relation is a linear order and that in the general case it can be always completed into a linear order. Moreover an easy consequence of this definition is that R SMAJ ( r ) is always a partial order. One can show that a set of linear orders is a Condorcet domain if and only if the strict majority rule applied to any profile of n linear orders of the domain with n an odd integer leads always to a linear order 48 . In fact we are going to consider Condorcet domains satisfying the stronger condition of stability, namely that this linear order must belong to the domain.
The best known example of stable domain is the single-peaked domain B defined by Black 49 . Since its definition needs to take a reference linear order L considered as the "objective" order between the alternatives 48 This definition is also equivalent to saying that D has no cyclic triples, i.e. that there do not exist a subset {x,y,z} of three alternatives and three linear orders in D such that the restrictions of these orders to {x,y,z} is a cyclic permutation like xyz, yzx and zxy (such a set D has been also called a consistent or an acyclic or a majority-consistent set, see the references in footnotes 53 and 54) . it is also called the domain of L-unimodal linear orders. Now one finds in Guilbaud's paper an analysis of the single-peaked domain showing that the set of single-peaked linear orders has a distributive lattice structure and that the majority relation of a profile in this domain is the median of the elements of the profile in this lattice (see page 289 and the figure showing the distributive lattice of the 16 single-peaked linear orders on a set of cardinality 5).
Using another paper by Guilbaud and Rosenstiehl 50 , one can generalize this result. Indeed Guilbaud and Rosenstiehl show that the set L of linear orders can be endowed with a lattice structure called the "permutoèdre" lattice. This lattice has an arbitrary linear order L as the greatest element and the dual of L as the least element. The unoriented covering relation of this lattice is the adjacency relation where the linear order L is adjacent to the linear order L' if they differ on a unique pair of elements. The permutoèdre lattice is not distributive but it contains distributive sublattices. We say that a sublattice of L is covering if the covering relation in this sublattice is the same as the covering relation in L. The following result is due to Chameni-Nembua 51 :
Any distributive covering sublattice of the permutoèdre lattice L is a stable domain and thus a Condorcet domain.
Indeed in this distributive lattice to take the majority relation of a profile of n (odd integer) linear orders reduces to taking the (metric or algebraic) median of these n elements. More generally the lattice interval [m 1 (u ), m 2 (u )] associated with an arbitrary profile u of linear orders in this lattice is exactly the set of linear orders containing the strict majority relation R SMAJ (u ) . 52 it was interesting since the best lower bound on the size of a Condorcet domain was then given by an Abello and Johnson's construction 53 which for n = 6 was 44. On the other hand Figure 3 illustrates in the case of n = 6 a general construction of Condorcet domains found later independently by Craven and Fishburn 54 . Figure 3 HERE A Condorcet domain sublattice of the permutoèdre lattice on 6 elements.
W h y t h e C o n d o r c e t e f f e c t ?
Another significant contribution of Guilbaud's paper was to bring together the Condorcet effect and some other "paradoxes" like the paradox raised by Quetelet's "homme moyen". The statistician and social scientist Quetelet proposed to extend the notion of mean to a population of individuals 55 .To do that he considers the measures of several characteristics of these individuals (size, weight, strength...) and he calculates the means of these measures for each characteristic. The problem is that a mean man so defined could be an impossible man. This fundamental objection is well presented by Cournot who writes: "When one applies mean operations to various parts of a complicated system, one must be aware that these mean values can be incompatible: the state of the system where all elements take the mean values separately determined for each could be an impossible state" 56 . And Cournot gives the example of the triangle obtained by taking the means of the lengths of the three sides of rectangular triangles, a triangle which in general is not rectangular.
More generally Guilbaud considers a method of aggregation of complex objects that can be called a component-wise (algebraic) mean method. It consists first of decomposing complex objects into their simple elements, then of applying to each series of such elements an algebraic mean operation. By definition an essential property of this method is its property of independence: each series of simple elements is aggregated (by the same or by different mean operations) independently of the other series. Now as soon as the complex objects considered are defined by some relations between their simple elements, the aggregated complex object does not necessarily satisfy these same relations. In Condorcet's case the simple elements are the ordered pairs forming the linear orders and the mean operation is the majority relation taken on each pair. One can represent any binary relation R on A = {a 1 , ... x 2 (transitivity). To take the majority on each pair keeps always the first (trivial) reflexivity property. It keeps always the second one if the number of voters is odd, but it need not maintain the transitivity one, which is exactly the Condorcet effect. Note that it is no more paradoxical than the fact that the majority rule applied to a even number of complete relations can induce an incomplete relation. Formally one can consider that the objects to be aggregated are defined as p-tuples of a set X of elementary objects (or more generally as elements of a direct product y X i ).The set of all the possible objects is then X p . If all these objects are admissible the component-wise mean method for aggregating them causes no problem. But if the set S of admissible objects is a subset of X p defined by a set of formulas linking the components of the objects, then to use this method requires closure properties of the aggregation operator m with respect to : x 1 , .... Another merit of Guilbaud's analysis was to show that the same logical problem of aggregation was occurring in several domains. Nevertheless it was only more than thirteen years later that it was shown that the use of an independence axiom in consensus problems arising in data analysis leads to state impossibility theorems 57 resulting from similar unavoidable contradictions.
Finally, Guilbaud mentioned as a possible solution to the general aggregation problem the metric method illustrated above in the case of aggregating linear orders: to calculate (metric) medians. In fact this method belongs to the classes of methods proposed by Maurice Fréchet in the forties. In his paper Réhabilitation de la notion statistique de l'homme moyen 58 , quoted by Guilbaud, Fréchet presented informally how to apply some of his mathematical results on the "typical elements" (a generalization of the central values of random variables) of arbitrary random elements in an arbitrary abstract metric space 59 . It is interesting to add that as early as 1914 the median method has been also proposed in the case of subsets of (what are now called) Euclidean spaces by the well-known Italian statistician Corrado Gini and still about "l'homme moyen" 60 .
C o n c l u s i o n
As we said in our introduction most of the researches conducted at CAMS in the domain of social choice theory and more generally of consensus theories were developments of ideas found in Guilbaud's paper. But as it is usual in science these researches of CAMS members met researches led independently elsewhere or/and inspired researches led by other people (in cooperation or not with CAMS members).
Let us mention quickly some of the research directions and results. A first direction concerns preferences and social choice theory with for instance the study of the permutoèdre and of restricted domains, or the use of ultrafilters for Arrowian or Gibbard and Satterthwaite theorems. A second direction concerns axiomatic or metric consensus theories in other fields and particularly in data analysis (consensus of partitions, classification trees etc.). Transversely to these directions many researches have concerned medians. In particular the link has been made with works made completely independently since the forties in "pure" lattice or graph theories. It is now clear what are the "good" discrete metric spaces for medians, i.e. the spaces where medians can be easily computed from algebraic formulas: they are the so-called median semilattices which contain in particular the distributive lattices and the tree semilattices 61 . The computation of medians in the "bad" cases (like those of linear orders) lead 58 Les Conférences du Palais de la Découverte, Paris, 1949. 59 Recall that the notion of distance i.e. of metric space goes back to Frechet in 1904. 60 Gini C (1914) L'uomo medio. Giornali degli economiste e revista de statistica 48: 1-24. The notion of the metric median in Euclidean spaces goes back to a problem raised by Fermat in 1629 and it has been used for location problems since Weber's 1909 book Uber den Standort der Industrien (see Monjardet B. , Éléments pour une histoire de la médiane métrique, In Moyenne, Milieu, Centre. Histoires et usages (1991) to many researches to find exact algorithms and (since the problem is NPcomplete) "good" heuristics. From an axiomatic point of view the median rule has been axiomatized in many spaces 62 . On the other hand it has for instance been shown only recently that this rule satisfies the Paretian property in the metric space defined by the symmetric difference distance between partial orders on a set, although it does not satisfy it for other distances defined between partial orders 63 . More abstractly, axiomatic or metric consensus theories have been developed in lattices, semilattices or posets, since for instance these theories allow one to derive from an Arrowian theorem in such "abstract" structures several known or new Arrowian theorems in various "concrete" domains 64 .
The annex below contains the papers on the above topics written by at least a CAMS member or associate member since Guilbaud's paper in 1952. They are ranked by year of publication. A Condorcet domain sublattice of the permutoèdre lattice on 6 elements.
